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Unfair elections in Hungary? Highly unfortunate, but not for me: I’m not a Hungarian.
That thought is as expectable as it is wrong, at least for an EU citizen – one of
the many things I have taken away from our "Constitutional Resilience" Workshop
this week in Berlin (more on this soon). Six months from now, at the European
elections on 26 May 2019, we will be able to see once again how the cancer cells
of the Hungarian autocracy are already spreading through our collective political
bloodstream in the EU.
Elections in Hungary are, according to the OSCE election observers in 2014, free but
not fair. Classical manipulation in the sense of destroying ballots boxes and faking
vote counts – that’s all old-school authoritarianism, Viktor Orbán doesn’t need any
of that. No, the fact that only he and no-one else can effectively win an election in
Hungary is guaranteed by ways more subtle and difficult to grasp.
Take party funding, for example. In Germany, since the big party donation
scandals of the 1980s and 1990s, we have been accustomed, for good reasons,
to considering strict regulation and supervision to be a good thing. In Hungary,
however, this seems to have turned into another rather useful autocratic tool. In
January 2018, a couple of weeks before the national parliamentary elections, the
State Audit Office, a parliamentary body in charge of supervising party funding,
suddenly declared to have discovered a number of grave errors in the accounts
of several opposition parties. Above all, the largest opposition party, far-right
Jobbik, allegedly had purchased billboard space at reduced prices, which the SAO
considered an illegal financial contribution and obliged Jobbik to pay back 663
million HUF (approx. 2 million €). The government, however, generously deferred the
payment of this ruinous sum until an undetermined time after the election.
+++++A Note from ICON*S++++++
The ICON·S Italian Chapter is proud to announce that its Inaugural Conference,
Unity and fragmentation within and beyond the State, will be held in Rome,
November 23-24. The program is available here (here is the full version, with all the
parallel panels sessions).
++++++Paid Advertisement++++++
Most parties in Hungary are dependent on the drip-feeding of state party funding;
membership fees and donations make up but a small part of their income. The
SAO, whose independence is as trustworthy as that of any other state institution
in FIDESZ' Two-Thirds-Majoritania, routinely audits party finances every two
years on the basis of a rather vague legal statutory definition of unlawful financial
contributions. If it declares to have found a mistake, the party has to pay the
allegedly illegally obtained amount to the state budget and has the same amount
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deducted from its share of state funding. The SAO does not disclose exactly the
basis of its calculations, and anyone who criticises this is dismissed as politically
motivated. The party concerned has no way to challenge the decision in court.
Which also means that there is no further case law on how to interpret the statutory
definition. Lots of leeway there to exploit if you (factually) serve at the pleasure of the
Prime Minister.
That is pure Orbán, so subtle, so clever. Compare this to the clumsy,
unsophisticated PiS yokels over in Poland with their constant breaches of the
constitution. The showpiece of this is the temporary deferment of the sanction. This
keeps the sword hanging above the head of the opposition, ready to strike at any
time but never doing, never anything happening for which Orbán would have to take
responsibility for. The opposition survives at the mercy of the all-powerful ruler. Until
2017, the SAO had always acted with self-restraint in terms of interfering in political
competition, but then, all of a sudden and unexpectedly, it lashes out. This is how
you train a loyal opposition for yourself. Emperor Palputin is certainly very pleased
with his favourite disciple.
And now to the European elections. As in the national parliamentary elections
in April, Orbán’s government will spend staggering sums to spray the whole
country from top to bottom with toxic PR foam so thickly that not a single bit of the
political public sphere will have a chance to flourish. A number of oddly meek and
discouraged and unattractive competitors will be on the ballot. Orbán’s FIDESZ will
have no trouble keeping or extending its 12 seats in the European Parliament –
seats that are very precious to the European People’s Party because they will help to
underpin its claim of its Spitzenkandidat Manfred Weber to the office of Commission
President. With Orbán’s support and the promise to "build bridges" and "reunite
the divided continent", the EPP will once again conquer a quarter ore more of the
seats in the European Parliament and become the strongest parliamentary group,
and Angela Merkel’s successor, in order not to have the CSU as an enemy, will
push Weber through as Commission President, and all of us, whether we vote in
Hungary and complain to the Hungarian election supervisor about the Hungarian EP
elections or in Germany and to the German election supervisor about the German
EP elections, will be told that all this is democratic like you wouldn’t believe and a
great success for the legitimacy of the European Union.
Confidential matters
In Britain the government is veering towards a cliff, and so is the belief that anything
good can come from Brexit after all. Whether Theresa May will get a majority for her
Withdrawal Agreement in Parliament appears uncertain, to say the least. KENNETH
ARMSTRONG looks into the details of the "backstop" arrangement to avoid a
hard border on the Northern Ireland and asks if it is a temporary safety net or a
permanent trap or perhaps even a trampoline to jump on to something more stable
and beneficial. TOBIAS LOCK explains what the agreement means for the European
Court of Justice – in particular the planned arbitration system, which, as is well
known, is not feature commonly regarded with delight in Luxembourg. But all that will
be moot if the whole arrangement ultimately goes down that cliff, I guess.
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In Germany, there was an attempt this week to once again fan the smoldering
embers of the "rule of lawlessness" myth about the government’s decision to keep
the borders open to refugees back in 2015. A non-paper from the Ministry of the
Interior from October 2015 has been leaked to the press which allegedly shows that
the shutting of the borders was indeed considered and thought legally not entirely off
the wall. DANIEL THYM explains why this revelation does nothing to prove the "rule
of lawlessness" point, however –  in effect, rather the opposite (German).
Another confidential paper with explosive content is the statement of the Council
Legal Service in Brussels, which considers the conditionality of EU budget funds
to rule-of-law compliance legally problematic whereby, in the opinion of KIM LANE
SCHEPPELE, LAURENT PECH and DANIEL KELEMEN, this body ranks itself
among the EU institutions that consistently refuse to read the signs of the time.
Signs, which are not exclusively written in Polish or Hungarian, as it seems: The
EU Commission’s latest report on Bulgaria under the Cooperation and Verification
Mechanism is another shocker of the same mould. Again, the fact that the Bulgarian
governing party is a member of Manfred Weber’s (and Jean-Claude Juncker’s)
European People’s Party seems to be enough to outweigh its most blatant sins
against the rule of law, according to RADOSVETA VASSILEVA’s bitter conclusion.
ROBERT UERPMANN-WITZACK offers a conciliatory reading of the UN Migration
Pact, which the AfD in Germany uses as a mobilisation tool, and welcomes the
opportunity for a debate in the Bundestag (German).
The Vatican City State has rarely been the subject of Verfassungsblog articles so
far, and it is this week in a somewhat unobvious respect, too: Could the Vatican
flag be flown by refugee rescue ships in the Mediterranean to end their predicament
of not getting a registration anywhere else anymore? FABIAN ENDEMANN and
VALENTIN SCHATZ are investigating this possibility from the point of view of
international law.
Elsewhere
JOANNE FISH criticises the ECtHR for not taking freedom of research seriously
enough in its ruling on university protests in Georgia.
LEONID SIROTA reports on the decision of the Supreme Court of New Zealand
(one of three countries in the world without a written constitution) to declare itself
competent to state the incompatibility of statutory law with the human rights act.
SIGRID VAN WINGERDEN and JAKUP DRÁPAL praise the Dutch guidelines for
prosecutors, which make their decisions and motions more consistent, as a potential
model for abroad.
RAFAEL JIMENEZ ASENSIO is annoyed that the Spanish Judicial Council is in
need of reform all over again.
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ROBERT CRAIG explains what will happen constitutionally if the Brexit agreement
will fall through in the UK parliament.
MIRIAM INGESON reports that in Sweden heads of corporations that have
committed human rights violations abroad can be held criminally liable.
That’s all for this week. All the best, and take care,
Max Steinbeis
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